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I. INTRODUCTION
Documents released over the past year detailing the National Security Agency’s
telephony metadata collection program and interception of international content under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) directly implicated U.S. high
technology companies in government surveillance.1 The result was an immediate, and
detrimental, impact on U.S. firms, the economy, and U.S. national security.
The first Snowden documents, printed June 5, 2013, revealed that the U.S.
government had served orders on Verizon, directing the company to turn over
telephony metadata under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.2 The following
day, The Guardian published classified slides detailing how the NSA had intercepted
international content under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act.3 The type of
information obtained ranged from E-mail, video and voice chat, videos, photos, and
stored data, to Voice over Internet Protocol, file transfers, video conferencing,
notifications of target activity, and online social networking details.4 The companies
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1 See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill, NSA Taps into Internet Giants’ Systems to Mine User
Data, Secret Files Reveal, THE GUARDIAN (London), June 6, 2013; Barton Gellman and Laura Poitras,
U.S. Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH.
POST, June 6, 2013; Glenn Greenwald, NSA collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers
Daily, THE GUARDIAN (London), June 6, 2013; Glenn Greenwald, Microsoft Handed the NSA Access to
Encrypted Messages, THE GUARDIAN, Jul. 11, 2013, available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data; NSA Taps Yahoo,
Google Links, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2013. For statutory and constitutional analysis of the telephony
metadata program and the interception of international content, see Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata
Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37(3) HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y, 757-900
(2014), available at
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2360&context=facpub; Section 702
and the collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38(1) HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y,
(2015), available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1355/.
2 Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, THE
GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phonerecords-verizon-court-order.
3 Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google,
and Others, THE GUARDIAN, June 6, 2013, available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech- giants-nsa-data.
4 Id.
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involved read like a who’s who of U.S. Internet giants: Microsoft, Yahoo, Google,
Facebook, PalTalk, YouTube, Skype, AOL, and Apple.5
More articles highlighting the extent to which the NSA had become embedded in
the U.S. high tech industry followed. In September 2013 ProPublica and the New
York Times revealed that the NSA had enjoyed considerable success in cracking
commonly-used cryptography.6 The following month the Washington Post reported
that the NSA, without the consent of the companies involved, had obtained millions of
customers’ address book data: in one day alone, some 444,743 email addresses from
Yahoo, 105,068 from Hotmail, 82,857 from Facebook, 33,697 from Gmail, and
22,881 from other providers.7 The extent of upstream collection stunned the public –
as did slides demonstrating how the NSA had bypassed the companies’ encryption,
intercepting data as it transferred between the public Internet and the Google cloud.8
Further documents suggested that the NSA had helped to promote encryption
standards for which it already held the key or whose vulnerabilities the NSA
understood but not taken steps to address.9 Beyond this, press reports indicated that
the NSA had at times posed as U.S. companies—without their knowledge—in order
to gain access to foreign targets. In November 2013 Der Spiegel reported that the
NSA and the United Kingdom’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)
had created bogus versions of Slashdot and LinkedIn, so that when employees from
the telecommunications firm Belgacom tried to access the sites from corporate
computers, their requests were diverted to the replica sites that then injected malware
into their machines.10
As a result of growing public awareness of these programs, U.S. companies have
lost revenues, even as non-U.S. firms have benefited. 11 In addition, numerous
5
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Nicole Perlroth, Jeff Larson, and Scott Shane, NSA Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web, N.
Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internetencryption.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
7 Barton Gellman and Ashkan Soltani, NSA Collects Millions of E-mail Address Books Globally, WASH.
POST, Oct. 14, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collectsmillions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c67e6dd8d22d8f_story.html.
8 Barton Gellman and Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data Centers Worldwide,
Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2013, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-datacenters-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74d89d714ca4dd_story.html.
9 James Ball, Julian Borger, and Glenn Greenwald, Revealed: How US and UK Spy Agencies Defeat
Internet Privacy and Security, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 5, 2013, available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security.
10 Steven Levy, How the US Almost Killed the Internet, WIRED, Jan. 7, 2014, available at
http://www.wired.com/2014/01/how-the-us-almost-killed-the-internet/all/.
11 See, e.g., Sam Gustin, NSA Spying Scandal Could Cost U.S. Tech Giants Billions, TIME, Dec. 10, 2013,
available at http://business.time.com/2013/12/10/nsa-spying-scandal-could-cost-u-s-tech-giants-billions/.
(“The National Security Agency spying scandal could cost the top U.S. tech companies billions of dollars
over the next several years, according to industry experts. In addition to consumer Internet companies,
hardware and cloud-storage giants like IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and Oracle could suffer billions of dollars
in losses.”); Ellen Messmer, U.S. High-Tech Industry feeling the Heat from Edward Snowden Leaks,
NETWORKWORLD, Jul. 19, 2013 (“The disclosures about the National Security Agency’s massive global
surveillance by Edward Snowden, the former information-technology contractor who’s now wanted by
the U.S. government for treason, is hitting the U.S. high-tech industry hard as it tries to explain its
involvement in the NSA data-collection program.”); Claire Cain Miller, Revelations of N.S.A. Spying
Cost U.S. Tech Companies, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2014, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/fallout-from-snowden-hurting-bottom-line-of-techcompanies.html?_r=0 (writing, “Despite the tech companies’ assertions that they provide information on
6
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countries, concerned about consumer privacy as well as the penetration of U.S.
surveillance efforts in the political sphere, have accelerated localization initiatives,
begun restricting U.S. companies’ access to local markets, and introduced new
privacy protections—with implications for the future of Internet governance and U.S.
economic growth. These effects raise attendant concerns about U.S. national security.
Congress has an opportunity to redress the current situation in at least three ways.
First, and most importantly, reform of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act would
provide for greater restrictions on NSA surveillance. Second, new domestic
legislation could extend better protections to consumer privacy. These shifts would
allow U.S. industry legitimately to claim a change in circumstance, which would help
them to gain competitive ground. Third, the integration of economic concerns at a
programmatic level within the national security infrastructure would help to ensure
that economic matters remain central to national security determinations in the future.
II. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF NSA PROGRAMS
Billions of dollars are on the line because of worldwide concern that the services
provided by U.S. information technology companies are neither secure nor private.12
Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent than in cloud computing. Approximately 50%
of the worldwide revenues previously came from the United States.13 The domestic
market more than tripled in value 2008-2014.14 But within weeks of the Snowden
documents, reports had emerged that U.S. companies such as Dropbox, Amazon Web
Services, and Microsoft’s Azure were losing business. 15 By December 2013, ten
percent of the Cloud Security Alliance had cancelled U.S. cloud services projects as a
result of the Snowden information. 16 In January 2014 a survey of Canadian and
British businesses found that one quarter of the respondents were moving their data
outside the United States.17 The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation
estimates that declining revenues of corporations that focus on cloud computing and
data storage alone could reach $35 billion over the next three years. 18 Other
commentators, such as Forrester Research analyst James Staten, have put actual losses

their customers only when required under law – and not knowingly through a back door – the perception
that they enabled the spying program has lingered.”)
12 IT Industries Set to Lose Billions Because of Privacy Concerns, UPI, Dec. 17, 2013, available at
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2013/12/17/IT-industries-set-to-lose-billionsbecause-of-privacy-concerns/UPI-30251387333206/ (“Information technology companies stand to lose
billions of dollars of business because of concerns their services are neither secure nor private.”).
13 Gartner Predict Cloud computing Spending to Increase by 100% in 2016, Says AppsCare, PR WEB,
July 19, 2012, available at http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/7/prweb9711167.htm.
14 Id.
15 David Gilbert, Companies Turn to Switzerland for Cloud Storage Following NSA Spying Revelations,
INT’L BUSINESS TIMES, July 4, 2013, available at http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/business-turns-awaydropbox-towards-switzerland-nsa-486613.
16 Mieke Eoyang & Gabriel Horwitz, Opinion: NSA Snooping’s Negative Impact on Business Would
Have the Foundign Fathers “Aghast,” FORBES, Dec. 20, 2013, available at
http://snewsi.com/id/1342616710/NSA-Snoopings-Negative-Impact-On-Business-Would-Have-TheFounding-Fathers-Aghast.
17 NSA Scandal: UK and Canadian Business Wary of Storing Data in the US, PEER 1 HOSTING, Jan. 8,
2014.
18 Id. See also Mary DeRosa, U.S. Cloud Services Companies Are Paying Dearly for NSA Leaks, TECH
INSIDER, Mar. 24, 2014, available at http://www.nextgov.com/voices/mary-derosa/8437/ (reporting
estimates of losses of $22 billion over the next three years).
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as high as $180 billion by 2016, unless something is done to restore confidence in data
held by U.S. companies.19
The economic impact of the NSA programs extends beyond cloud computing to
the high technology industry. Cisco, Qualcomm, IBM, Microsoft, and HewlettPackard have all reported declining sales as a direct result of the NSA programs. 20
Servint, a webhosting company based in Virginia, reported in June 2014 that its
international clients had dropped by 50% since the leaks began.21 Also in June, the
German government announced that because of Verizon’s complicity in the NSA
program, it would end its contract with the company, which had previously provided
services to a number of government departments. 22 As a senior analyst at the
Information Technology and Innovation Foundation explained, “It’s clear to every
single tech company that this is affecting their bottom line.” 23 The European
commissioner for digital affairs, Neelie Kroes, predicts that the fallout for U.S.
businesses in the EU alone will amount to billions of Euros.24
Not only are U.S. companies losing customers, but they have been forced to spend
billions to add encryption features to their services. IBM has invested more than a
billion dollars to build data centers in London, Hong Kong, Sydney, and elsewhere, in
an effort to reassure consumers outside the United States that their information is
protected from U.S. government surveillance. 25 Salesforce.com made a similar
announcement in March 2014. 26 Google moved to encrypt terms entered into its
browser.27 And in June 2014 the company released the source code for End-to-End,
its newly-developed browser plugin that allows users to encrypt email prior to it being
sent across the Internet.28 The following month Microsoft announced Transport Layer
Security for inbound and outbound email, and Perfect Forward Secrecy encryption for
access to OneDrive. 29 Together with the establishment of a Transparency Center,
where foreign governments could review source code to assure themselves of the
integrity of Microsoft software, the company sought to put an end to both NSA back
door surveillance and doubt about the integrity of Microsoft products.30
19

IT Industries Set to Lose Billions Because of Privacy Concerns, UPI, Dec. 17, 2013, available at
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2013/12/17/IT-industries-set-to-lose-billionsbecause-of-privacy-concerns/UPI-30251387333206/. This number includes domestic customers who
may go elsewhere to find greater privacy protections. See Gustin, supra note 11.
20 Sean Gallagher, NSA Leaks Blamed for Cisco’s Falling Sales Overseas, ARS TECHNICA, Dec. 10, 2013;
Paul Taylor, Cisco Warns Emerging Market Weakness is no Blip, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2013; Spencer E.
Ante, Qualcomm CEO Says NSA Fallout Impacting China Business, WALL. ST. J., Nov. 22, 2013; Miller,
supra note 11.
21 Julian Hattem, Tech Takes Hit from NSA, THE HILL, June 30, 2014.
22 Andrea Peterson, German Government to Drop Verizon over NSA spying Fears, WASH. POST, June 26,
2014.
23 Id.
24 Eoyang et al, supra note 16.
25 Miller, supra note 11.
26 Id.
27 Danny Sullivan, Post-PRISM, Google Confirms Quietly Moving to Make All Searches Secure, Except
for Ad Clicks, SEARCH ENGINE LAND, Sept. 23, 2013, available at http://searchengineland.com/postprism-google-secure-searches-172487.
28 Klint Finley, Google Renews Battle With the NSA by Open Sourcing Email Encryption Tool, WIRED,
June 3, 2014, available at http://www.wired.com/2014/06/end-to-end/.
29 Matt Thomlinson, Vice President Trustworthy Computing Security, Microsoft, Advancing our
Encryption and Transparency Efforts, Press Release, available at http://blogs.microsoft.com/on-theissues/2014/07/01/advancing-our-encryption-and-transparency-efforts/. See also Carly Page, Microsoft
Installs Tougher Outlook and Onedrive Encryption to Curb NSA Snooping, THE INQUIRER, Jul. 1, 2014, a
http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2353073/microsoft-installs-better-outlook-and-onedriveencryption-to-curb-nsa-snooping.
30 Id.
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Foreign technology companies, in turn, are seeing revenues increase.31 Runbox,
for instance, an email service based in Norway and a direct competitor to Gmail and
Yahoo, almost immediately made it publicly clear that it does not comply with foreign
court requests for its customers’ personal information. 32 Its customer base increased
34% in the aftermath of the Snowden revelations.33 Mateo Meier, CEO of Artmotion
(Switzerland’s biggest offshore data hosting company), reported that within the first
month of the Snowden releases, the company saw a 45% rise in revenue.34 Because
Switzerland is not a member of the EU, the only way to access data in a Swiss data
center is as a result of an official court order demonstrating guilt or liability; there are
no exceptions for the United States.35 In April 2014, Brazil and the European Union,
which previously used U.S. firms to supply undersea cables for transoceanic
communications, decided to build their own cables between Brazil and Portugal, using
Spanish and Brazilian companies in the process. 36 OpenText, Canada’s largest
software company, now guarantees customers that their data remains outside the
United States. Deutsche Telekom, a cloud computing provider, is similarly gaining
more customers.37 In sum, numerous foreign companies are marketing their products
as “NSA proof” or “safer alternatives” to those offered by U.S. firms, gaining market
share in the process.38
III. FOREIGN GOVERNMENT RESPONSES
The Snowden documents revealed not just the extent to which high technology
companies had become coopted, but that the targets of NSA surveillance include both
allied and non-allied countries.39 The resulting backlash has led some commentators
to raise concern that “the Internet will never be the same.” 40 Jurisdictional questions
and national borders previously marked the worldwide Internet discussions. 41
Countries, however, are now using the disclosures to restrict data storage to national
borders, making it more difficult for the United States to gain access.42 As risk is the
balkanization of the Internet, undermining its traditional culture of open access, and
increasing the cost of doing business.43
31

Id.
Miller, supra note 11.
33 Id.
34 Gilbert, supra note 15.
35 Id.
36 Miller, supra note 11.
37 Id.
38 Mark Scott, European Firms Turn Privacy into Sales Pitch, N. Y. TIMES, June 11, 2014.
39 See, e.g., Laura Poitras, Marcel Rosenbach, Fidelius Schmid and Holger Stark, NSA Spied on European
Union Offices, DER SPIEGEL, June 29, 2013; Laura Poitras, Marcel Rosenbach, and Holger Stark,
Codename “Apalachee”: How America Spies on Europe and the UN, DER SPEIGEL ONLINE, Aug. 26,
2013, available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/secret-nsa-documents-show-how-the-usspies-on-europe-and-the-un-a-918625.html; EXCUSIVE: US spies on Chinese Mobile Phone Companies,
Steals SMS Data: Edward Snowden, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, June 22, 2013, available at
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1266821/us-hacks-chinese-mobile-phone-companies-stealssms-data-edward-snowden; Lana Lam, US Hacked Pacnet, Asia Pacific Fibre-Optic Network Operator,
in 2009, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (HONG KONG), June 23, 2013; Ewen MacAskill, Julian Borger,
NEW NSA LEAKS SHOW HOW US IS BUGGING ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), June 30,
2013.
40 Levy, supra note 10.
41 See, e.g., Kristina Irion, Government Cloud Computing and National Data Sovereignty, SOCIAL
SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK, June 2012.
42 Levy, supra note 10.
43 Id.
32
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A. Data Localization and Data Protection
Countries around the world are increasingly adopting data localization laws,
restricting the storage, analysis, and transfer of digital information to national
borders.44 To some extent, the use of barriers to trade as a means of incubating techbased industries predated the Snowden releases.45 However, in the aftermath of the
leaks, the dialogue has accelerated. The asserted purpose is to protect both
government data and consumer privacy.
As of the time of writing, China, Greece, Malaysia, Russia, South Korea,
Venezuela, Vietnam, and others have already implemented local data server
requirements. 46 Turkey has introduced new privacy regulations preventing the
transfer of personal data (particularly locational data) overseas. 47 Others, such as
Argentina, India, and Indonesia are actively considering new laws, even as Brazilian
president, Dilma Rousseff, has been promoting a law that would require citizens’
personal data to be stored within domestic bounds. 48 Germany and France are
considering a Schengen routing system, retaining as much online data in the European
Union as possible.49
As a regional matter, the EU Commission’s Vice President, Viviane Reding, is
pushing for Europe to adopt more expansive privacy laws.50 And in March 2014 the
European Parliament passed the Data Protection Regulation and Directive, imposing
strict limits on the handling of EU citizens’ data. Regardless of where the information
is based, those handling the data must obtain the consent of the data subjects to having
their personal information processed. They also retain the right to later withdraw
consent. Those violating the directive face steep fines, including up to five percent of
revenues.
In addition, the Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs Committee of the
European Parliament passed a resolution calling for the end of the US/EU Safe Harbor
agreement.51 Some 3000 U.S. companies rely on this framework to conduct business
with the EU.52

44

Jonah Force Hill, The Growth of Data Localization Post-Snowden: Analysis and Recommendations for
U.S. Policymakers and Industry Leaders, 2(3) LAWFARE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, Jul. 21, 2014.
45 See, e.g., Stephen J. Ezell, Robert D. Atkinson, and Michaelle A. Wein, Localization Barriers to
Trade: Threat to the Global Innovation Economy, The Information Technology & Innovation
Foundation, Sept. 2013, available at http://copyrightalliance.org/sites/default/files/resources/2013localization-barriers-to-trade.pdf.
46 Sidley Austin, LLP., Privacy, Data Security and Information Law Update, Dec. 30, 2013, available at
http://www.sidley.com/files/News/1ce5014c-9236-41cb-87ba32dee9163fed/Presentation/NewsAttachment/6d72f3e3-6b28-4d23-bc9a5493071c9b13/12.30.2013%20Privacy%20Update.pdf.
47 Richard Chirgwin, USA Opposes “Schengen Cloud” Eurocentric Routing Plan, THE REGISTER (United
Kingdom), Apr. 7, 2014, available at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/04/07/keeping_data_away_from_the_us_not_on_ustr/.
48 Levy, supra note 10.
49 See, e.g., Weighing a Schengen Zone for Europe’s Internet Data, DEUTSCHE WELL, Feb. 20, 2014,
available at http://www.dw.de/weighing-a-schengen-zone-for-europes-internet-data/a-17443482 ;
Deutsche Telekom: “Internet Data Made in Germany should Stay in Germany,” DEUTSCHE WELLE, Oct.
18, 2013, available at http://www.dw.de/about-dw/who-we-are/s-3325.
50 Mike Eoyang & Gabriel Horwitz, Opinion: NSA Snooping’s Negative Impact on Business Would have
the Founding Fathers “Aghast,” FORBES, Dec. 20, 2013.
51 NSA Snooping; MEPS TABLE PROPOSALS TO PROTECT EU CITIZENS’ PRIVACY, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT,
Feb. 12, 2014.
52 Alex Byers, Tech Safe Harbor Under Fire in Europe, POLITICO MORNING TECH, Nov. 6, 2013.
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In May 2014 the EU Court of Justice ruled that users have a “right to be
forgotten” in their use of online search engines. The case derived from a complaint
lodged against a Spanish newspaper, as well as Google Spain and Google Inc.,
claiming that notice of the plaintiff’s repossessed home on Google’s search engine
infringed his right to privacy because the incident had been fully addressed years
before. He requested that the newspaper be required to remove or alter the pages in
question to excise data related to him, and that Google Spain or Google Inc. be
required to remove the information. The EU court found that even where the physical
server of a company processing information is not located in Europe, as long as the
company has a branch or subsidiary and is doing business in a Member state, the 1995
Data Protection Directive applies.53 Because search engines contain personal data,
they are subject to such data protection laws. The Court recognized that, under certain
conditions, individuals have the “right to be forgotten”—i.e., the right to request that
search engines remove links containing personal information. Data that is inaccurate,
inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive may be removed. Not absolute, the right to be
forgotten must be weighed against competing rights, such as freedom of expression
and the media.
Various country-specific privacy laws are similarly poised to be introduced. Their
potential economic impact is not insubstantial: the Information Technology and
Innovation Fund estimates that data privacy rules could retard the growth of the
technology industry by up to four percent, impacting U.S. companies’ ability to
expand and forcing them out of existing markets.54
The current dialogue is merely the latest in a series of growing concerns about the
absent of effective privacy protections within the U.S. legal regime. High tech
companies appear to see this as a potential step forward. As Representative Justin
Amash (MI-R), has explained, “Businesses increasingly recognize that our
government’s out-of-control surveillance hurts their bottom line and costs American
jobs. It violates the privacy of their customers and it erodes American businesses’
competitive edge.”55
It is with concern about the impact of lack of privacy controls on U.S.
competitiveness in mind that in December 2013 some of the largest U.S. Internet
companies launched a campaign to pressure the government to reform the NSA
surveillance programs. Microsoft General Counsel Brad Smith explained: “People
won’t use technology they don’t trust.” He added, “Governments have put this trust at
risk, and governments need to help restore it.” Numerous high technology CEOs
supported the initiative, such Google’s Larry Page, Yahoo’s Marissa Mayer, and
Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg.56 The aim is to limit government authority to collect
user data, to institute better oversight and accountability, to ensure greater
transparency about what the government is requesting (and obtaining), to increase
respect for the free flow of data across borders, and to avoid political clashes on a
global scale. Mayer, explained, “Recent revelations about government surveillance
activities have shaken the trust of our users, and it is time for the United States
government to act to restore the confidence of citizens around the world.”57

53

Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 Oct. 1995 on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.
54 Michael Hickens, AMERICAN SPYING STYMIES TECH FIRMS, WALL STREET J., Feb. 18, 2014.
55 Gustin, supra note 11
56 Id.
57 Id.
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B. Global Initiatives Regarding Internet Governance
Apart from economic considerations, the backlash raises question about the future
of Internet governance. From the inception of the Internet, the U.S.-based Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) has governed the web. As
time has progressed, and the Internet has become part of the global infrastructure,
there have been calls from several nations to end U.S. dominance and to have the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), an entity within the UN, become the
governing body. The revelations have not only contributed further to such calls, but
they have spurred increased discussion of the need for regional Internet control.
Over the past decade, three main groups have emerged to vie for control of the
Internet. The first is centered on states, who consider the question in light of national
sovereignty. It is comprised of developing countries as well as large, emerging
economies like China, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa. 58 It overlaps significantly
with the Group of 77 (consisting of more than 100 countries which emerged from the
non-aligned movement in the Cold War). These states are critical of the United States
and its dominant role in Internet governance and oppose private sector preeminence,
on the grounds that they are pawns of the United States. Emphasis instead is placed
on the UN and the ITU as potential repositories of Internet authority.
The second group is civil society. The third is the private sector. These groups
both tend to support what is referred to as a “multistakeholder model:” i.e., native
Internet governance institutions that are generally nonprofit entities in the private
sector. 59 Membership includes both technical experts (e.g., ICANN and Regional
Internet Registries), as well as multinational corporations (e.g., Microsoft, Facebook,
and AT&T). Prior to the Snowden releases, Japan, the EU, and the US found
themselves in this camp. Civil society organizations emphasize Internet freedom,
consumer privacy, and user rights—often bringing them into conflict with the states
who comprise the G77-type group.60
As one commentator explains, “This alignment of actors has been in place since
the 2003 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) meetings. But the
Snowden NSA revelations seem to have destabilized this settled political
alignment.”61
In brief, ICANN and Brazil have formed an alliance, condemning U.S. actions.
Concern about the latest revelations spurred a major conference in April 2014: i.e., the
Global Multistakeholder Conference on the Future of Internet Governance. The
purpose of the meeting, which was held in Sao Paulo, was “to produce universal
internet principles and an institutional framework for multistakeholder Internet
governance.”62
It is not clear how the newest shifts will be resolved—either temporarily or in the
future. But significant, and enormously important, questions have been raised by the
Snowden revelations: How should the Internet governance be structured to ensure
legitimacy and compliance? Who gets to make the decision about what such
governance looks like? Which bodies have the authority to establish future rules and
procedures? How are such bodies constituted and who selects their membership?
58

Milton Mueller and Ben Wagner, Finding a Formula for Brazil: Representation and Legitimacy in
Internet Governance, (2013), p. 3, available at http://www.internetgovernance.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/MiltonBenWPdraft_Final.pdf.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id., at 4.
62 Id., at 1.
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These questions are fundamentally at odds with the decentralization tendencies in
the Internet—tendencies that have been exaggerated post-Snowden as a result of
regional efforts to expand the local sphere of influence and to protect consumer and
state privacy from U.S. surveillance.
The U.S. government’s failure to address the situation domestically has
undermined the tech industry. Despite calls from the companies for legislative reform
to address the breadth of the NSA programs, 63 there has been no significant shift that
would allow companies to approach their customers to say, with truth, that the
situation has changed.
Resultantly, American companies are losing not just
customers, but the opportunity to submit proposals for contracts for which they
previously would have been allowed to compete. 64 And the future of Internet
governance hangs in the balance.
IV. ECONOMIC SECURITY AS NATIONAL SECURITY
The NSA programs illustrate lawmakers’ failure to recognize the degree to which
economic strength is central to national security, as well as the importance of the high
technology industry to the U.S. economy. The concept of economic security as
national security is not new: the Framers and the generations that followed
acknowledged the importance of economic strength as central to national security.
Our more recent understandings, however, have gotten away from the concept, in the
process cleaving important interests out of the calculations required to accurately
understand the implications of government actions. Unintended consequences have
resulted: the NSA revelations, for instance, may have driven bad actors to seek nonU.S. companies for ISP services, creating gaps in insight into their operations. They
have also undermined U.S. efforts to call other countries to heel for their exploitation
of international communications to gain advantages over U.S. industry. In sum, the
expansive nature of the programs may well have acted to undermine U.S. national
security in myriad ways linked to the country’s economic interests.
A. Economic Security from the Founding
Despite its appearance throughout U.S. history, the term “national security” is
rarely defined. 65 The 1947 National Security Act, for instance, which, inter alia,
constituted the National Military Establishment (later the Department of Defense), and
the National Security Council, refers to “national security” more than 100 times; yet it
does not define the term. 66 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
employs the term nearly a dozen times, to ascertain what matters fall within the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s (FISC) purview, who can certify an
application to FISC, and under what conditions in camera and ex parte proceedings
can be held.67 Where the Attorney General ascertains that a national security threat
exists, officials may secretly search and seize property—waiting notice otherwise
required under the Fourth Amendment.68 But no definition is provided in FISA. Nor
See, e.g., Gustin, supra note 11 (reporting that the nation’s largest Internet companies are calling for
Congress and the Administration to reform the secret surveillance programs).
64 Miller, supra note 11.
65 See Laura K. Donohue, The Limits of National Security, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV., 1579 (2011).
66 National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-235, 61 Stat. 495 (current version at 50 U.S.C. §401
(2006)).
67 50 U.S.C. §§1803(e), 1804(a), 1806(f), and 1845(f).
68 50 USC §1825(b).
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does the USA PATRIOT Act prove more illuminating—despite referring to national
security more than two dozen times.69
Where we do find definitions in the U.S. Code, they tend to limit consideration to
foreign affairs and matters related to military strength. Thus, under the Classified
Information Procedures Act, “national security” is understood as involving matters
related to the “national defense and foreign relations of the United States.”70 Nowhere
does the definition reference U.S. economic security.
In the amended National Security Act, while the term could potentially be
understood to encompass U.S. economic security, the actual definition does not
specify a precise link to economic vitality. Instead, “intelligence related to national
security” refers to:
all intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and including
information gathered within or outside the United States, that
(A) pertains, as determined consistent with any guidance issued by
the President, to more than one United States Government agency;
and
(B) that involves—
(i)
threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests;
(ii)
the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; or
(iii)
any other matter bearing on United States national or homeland
security.71
The Federal Information Security management Act of 2002 (providing rules for
government-wide information security) similarly fails to consider the economic
underpinnings of national security, instead, understanding national security systems as
any system:
(i) the function, operation, or use of which
(I) involves intelligence activities;
(II) involves cryptologic activities related to national security;
(III) involves command and control of military forces;
(IV) involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or
weapons system; or
(V) subject to subparagraph (B), is critical to the direct fulfillment of
military or intelligence missions; or
(ii) is protected at all times by procedures established for information that
have been specifically authorized under criteria established by an
Executive order or an Act of Congress to be kept classified in the interest
of national defense or foreign policy.72
While there may be room in the definition for economic considerations, they are not
front and center.
Executive Branch articulations prove little better. President George W. Bush’s
five-page National Security Presidential Directive 1 referred to “national security”
69
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thirty-three times, without any definition. 73 President Barak Obama’s Presidential
Policy Directive 1 (PPD-1), in turn, addressing the National Security Council, referred
to “national security” thirty-three times—without ever defining it. 74 And like the
Executive Branch, Courts tend to look to the military and diplomatic aspects of
national security, instead of their economic concomitant.75
Despite the lack of emphasis on economic strength, the Founders were well aware
of the importance of the economy in fostering international independence. The
Articles of Confederation failed in significant part because the national government
lacked the resources, and the country the economic strength, to protect the Union. For
Alexander Hamilton, absent military might, diplomatic stature, and commercial
success, the country would cease to exist.76
One of the first expansions of the executive, accordingly, was to include a
Secretary of the Treasury, which, along with the Secretary of War and the
establishment of the office of Attorney General, reflected the purposes for which
Union had been sought: foreign relations, military strength, economic growth, and the
rule of law. In his Farewell Address, President George Washington called for U.S.
energies to be directed towards strengthening the U.S. economy: “[T]he great rule of
conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations, to
have with them as little political connection as possible.”77
The federal government was willing, from a very early date, to act in support of
its commercial interests with whatever diplomatic, legal, and military power it could
muster. 78 The Monroe Doctrine was premised largely on this approach. In 1837
President Martin Van Buren came to office determined to continue Washington’s
legacy, underscoring the importance of avoiding entangling alliances while pursuing
America’s economic interests abroad.79 President Zachary Taylor came to office in
1849 determined to continue the course, emphasizing the importance of bolstering
trade as a means of securing the country.80 The 1950 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty ensured
that future canal access through Central America would be open to international
trade.81 As Millard Fillmore succeeded Taylor, he considered commerce central to
U.S. interests abroad—for this reason, the Navy would require further resources to
protect trade along the Pacific Coast.82 Upon taking office, President Franklin Pierce
reiterated the same policies: of the complicated European tumults and anxieties, the
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United States was to be exempt, “But the vast interests of commerce are common to
all mankind, and the advantages of trade and international intercourse must always
present a noble field for the moral influence of a great people.” The United States
went on to emphasize its dealings with Asia and to sign an historic trade agreement
with Japan.83 Expansionism, and the economic benefits it brought, similarly proved
central to U.S. national security. “Should [new possessions] be obtained,” Pierce
asserted during his Inaugural Address, “it will be through no grasping spirit, but with
a view to obvious national interest and security, and in a manner entirely consistent
with the strictest observance of national faith.” From the 1898 Spanish-American
War forward, the country promoted its national interests through formative political,
military, and economic engagement in the international arena.
2. National Security Infrastructure
The National Security Council (NSC) is “the principal forum for consideration of
national security policy issues requiring Presidential determination.” 84 The President
looks to the forum for advice and assistance in matters ranging from domestic, foreign
and military, to intelligence and economic.85 It is thus somewhat surprising that the
1947 National Security Act includes neither the Secretary of the Treasury, nor the
Secretary of Commerce, as permanent (statutory) members of the NSC.
Instead, the entity is chaired by the President, with formal membership extended
to the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. The Chair
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff acts as the statutory military advisor, the Director of
National Intelligence the statutory intelligence advisor, and the Director of National
Drug Control Policy as the statutory drug control policy advisor.
Under PDD-1, the NSC includes the Secretary of Treasury, and “When
international economic issues are on the agenda of the NSC, the NSC’s regular
attendees will include the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade
Representative, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Chair of
the Council of Economic Advisers.”86
When the emphasis, however, is not international economic issues, the structure
does not cement economic concerns into the discussion. Nor does it contemplate the
inclusion of Treasury or Commerce as an operational matter—i.e., when the
intelligence community is deciding whether to develop a surveillance program. Such
matters are not brought directly to the NSC.87
To the extent that the failure to include these members at the most basic level
reflects a perspective that potentially sidelines economic concerns, the continued
failure to build in strong representation at a programmatic level underscores the
concern. Economic concerns may be treated with seriousness, but they are not
meaningfully integrated into the national security infrastructure.
3. Unintended Consequences
There are various ways in which the failure to fully take account of the impact of
the programs on U.S. industry may have acted to undermine U.S. security beyond
weakening the economy. The revelations, for instance, may well have driven enemies
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of the United States to use other countries’ Internet Service Providers, thus creating a
gap in our insight into their operations. They may similarly spur the initiation of
encryption techniques that the NSA will have no means to address—making the
country less secure because of the perceived overreach of the agency. The revelations
have also undermined U.S. credibility in challenging other countries’ efforts to obtain
trade secrets and other information through state surveillance. China provides one of
the strongest examples.
Online warfare between China and the United States has simmered in the
background, until in early 2013 the Obama Administration began to make it center
stage. In January 2013 the New York Times reported that Chinese hackers had
infiltrated its computers following a threat that if the paper insisted on publishing a
story about its prime minister, consequences would follow. 88 The following month a
security firm, Mandiant, revealed that the Chinese military unit 61398 had stolen data
from U.S. companies and agencies. 89 In March 2013 President Obama’s national
security advisor publicly urged China to reduce its surveillance efforts—following
which classified documents leaked to the public demonstrated the extent to which
China had infiltrated U.S. government servers.90 In May 2013 the National Security
Advisor flew to China to lay the groundwork for a summit, in which cyber
surveillance would prove center stage.91 Two days before the Obama-Xi meeting was
scheduled to take place, The Guardian ran the first story on the NSA programs. 92 On
June 7, when Obama raised the question of Chinese espionage, Xi responded by
quoting the Guardian and suggesting that the U.S. should not be lecturing the Chinese
about surveillance.93
Although differences may mark the two countries approaches to surveillance (e.g.,
in one case for economic advantage, in the other for political or security advantage),
the broader translation for the global community has been one in which the United
States has lost high ground to try to restrict cybersurveillance by other countries.
V. STEPS REQUIRED TO REDRESS THE CURRENT SITUATION
Numerous steps could be taken by Congress to address the situation in which U.S.
industry currently finds itself. The most effective and influential decision that
legislators could take would be to curb the NSA’s authorities under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act. This action has two components: first, ending the
telephony metadata collection program and, second, restricting the use of to/from, or
about collection under upstream interceptions. Both programs would further benefit
from greater transparency, to make it clear that their aim is to prevent foreign
aggression and to prevent threats to U.S. national security—not to engage in the
interception of trade secrets or to build dossiers on other countries’ populations.
The second most effective change that could be undertaken would be to introduce
stricter privacy controls on U.S. companies, in the process bringing the United States
into closer line with the principles that dominate in the European Union. The two
entities are not as far apart as the dialogue might have one assume, and so changes
required in this sphere would be minimal. Together, these two alterations—curbing
the NSA surveillance programs and providing increased consumer protections for
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privacy—would allow U.S. industry to argue changed circumstance to allow
companies to again become competitive for contracts and markets to which they seek
access.
A third alteration that would make a substantial difference over the longer term
relates to the national security infrastructure. The current failure of the United States
to integrate economic concerns creates a vulnerability for the country in terms of the
breadth and depth of programs subsequently adopted. New thought needs to be given
to how to take on board—and mitigate—potentially devastating economic
consequences of government surveillance efforts.
A. FISA Alterations
In addition to the economic impact of NSA telephony metadata collection
(discussed, infra), the program runs contrary to Congressional intent in introducing
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, contradicts the statutory language, and
violates the Fourth Amendment.94 In 2014 the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board came to a similar conclusion,95 as did the President’s own appointed Review
Group, charged with considering the telephony metadata collection program, in
2013.96
Accordingly, the President announced on January 17, 2014 that he was “ordering
a transition that will end the Section 215 bulk metadata program as it currently exists,
and establish a mechanism that preserves the capabilities we need without the
government holding this bulk metadata.” 97 The alternative approach was to be
developed by March 28, 2014. Nine months later, on September 13, 2014, the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court approved DOJ’s request to extend the
program for another 90 days—without any transition program in place.
Although the President issued a new presidential directive in January 2014 for
U.S. signals intelligence activities both at home and abroad, the classified nature of
parts of the document, international skepticism about the Administration’s
commitment to privacy, and the failure of the Administration to make good on its
promise of transition to a new program meant that the global community, with good
reason, has questioned whether anything has really changed. No new legislation is in
place that would provide limits on the Executive Branch beyond those that operated
for the duration of the bulk collection program.
As a matter of Section 702 and the interception of international content, both
PRISM and upstream collection present global concerns—neither of which have been
addressed through any legislative change. The existence of these programs, while
perhaps statutorily consistent with the FISA Amendments Act, as well as
constitutionally sufficient with regard to the interception of non-U.S. persons
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communications, where the individual is reasonably believed to be located outside the
United States, as a policy matter, goes some way towards undermining international
confidence in U.S. companies.
The Fourth Amendment does not reach non-U.S. persons based overseas who lack
a substantial connection to the United States.98 Writing for the Court in United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that “the people” referred to
in the Fourth Amendment indicate a particular group—not merely people qua
people. 99 His reading stems from a deeply Aristotelian approach: i.e., one that
emphasizes membership in the polis (πόλις), or political community, as a concomitant
of forming a structure of government.100 As members of the polis, U.S. persons, both
distributively and collectively, obtain the protections of the constitution.
Looked at in this regard, the Constitution itself embodies the collective
organization of “the people” into one entity. “U.S. persons” and “the people” are
therefore one and the same. The “right of the people” thus refers to a collective group
of individuals “who are part of a national community or who have otherwise
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that
community.”101
Very few cases address precisely what constitutes sufficient contact with the
United States to satisfy the “substantial connections” aspect of the majority’s decision.
Those that do point in seemingly different directions.102 At a minimum, however, it
would be extraordinary to assume that simply because an individual uses a U.S.
company, he or she thereby gains the protections of the Fourth Amendment. This was
the basic argument underlying the “modernization” of FISA in the first place, to take
account of bad actors, communicating overseas, who would suddenly fall within the
more protective FISA regime merely because their communications happened to come
within U.S. territory by nature of the carrier in question.
Even recognizing, however, that few constitutional barriers may apply to the
programmatic use of Section 702 insofar as it is applied to non-U.S. persons (leaving
aside the questions that accompany the incidental collection of U.S. persons’
information, as well as entirely domestic conversations), as a matter of policy,
certainly both PRISM and the use of to/from or about collection in upstream gathering
has dramatically undermined U.S. industry. As a matter of policy, therefore, greater
restrictions, more transparency, and more effective oversight of the international
collection of content may help to alter the situation with regard to the skepticism
expressed towards U.S. companies.
B. Privacy Law Harmonization
Much ink has been spilled on the cultural and practical differences between the U.S.
and EU with regard to data protection and privacy law. These differences have been
over-blown.
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There are myriad ways in which the two regions reflect a similar approach. Just
as the United States’ Fourth Amendment protects the right to privacy, for instance,
Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms embraces the same. 103 These documents constitutionally
ground two fundamental liberty interests in the respective regions’ governing
frameworks: (a) the right to privacy, and (b) freedom from arbitrary invasion of one’s
private sphere. In the European Union, these liberties are supported by EU-wide
directives, such as the 1995 European Data Protection Directive and the EU Internet
Privacy Law of 2002. Further, in both the EU and the U.S. such liberty interests are
protected through national legislation, in which a judicial remedy is provided for a
breach of the right to privacy. 104 The manner in which these rights are treated is
similarly consistent. In both spheres, these rights are offset against the obligations
owed by the data holder to the individual to whom the information relates.105
As a substantive matter, the two regions have adopted similar provisions. In both
the EU and the U.S., for instance, heightened protections are provided for what is
known as personally-identifiable information. 106 A series of exceptions to the
dominant structure is provided in two central areas: security (including, e.g., criminal
law, public security, defense, and national security) and freedom of expression (such
as with regard to journalism, literary pursuits, artistic expression, and political
opinions). 107 To ensure that the substantive measures reflect the underlying
constitutional principles, both regions insist on minimization—i.e., that the
information collected on individuals be limited to what is strictly necessary for the
purposes delineated by statute.108
Both the U.S. and the EU have established a set of substantive requirements
related to individuals’ knowledge that data about them is being collected, stored, and
possibly shared with others. Consent, for instance, is central to both systems. 109
Much has been made in regard to the distinction between the opt-in (European
approach) versus the opt-out (American approach). What has been lost, however, is
that both approaches rely on the consent of the subject (subject to specific exceptions,
above), in order to proceed with data gathering, analysis, and distribution. To
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facilitate this structure, both regions also require that notice be provided to targets and
that individuals have the right to access information that is held about them. 110
Individuals, in both systems, have the right to object to particular information, and in
both systems, the data holder has a duty to ensure that the information is accurate and
kept up to date.111
Keeping in mind the consistencies between the two systems, and the benefits to be
gained for U.S. industry from emphasizing harmony, there are two areas where the
two regions depart could be addressed through legislative reform: namely,
recognition of residual rights in third party data, and the creation of a comprehensive,
privacy-protective regime, as opposed to the piecemeal approach that currently marks
U.S. law.
1. Residual Rights in Third Party Data
One central question that divides the United States from numerous other countries
and regions—including the European Union—centers on who owns an individual’s
data. In the United States, since Smith v. Maryland (addressing pen registers and trap
and trace devices), and U.S. v. Miller (focusing on financial records), all three
branches have treated information held by third parties as lacking an individual right
to privacy.112
In contrast, the European Union considers that the individual who has provided
data to a third party to still have a privacy interest in the information.113 The recent
European Court decision, recognizing the right to anonymity, necessarily presupposes
a continued interest in data, even once it is obtained by a third party.
The difference between the approaches is central to understanding how new
technologies, such as social network analysis, cloud computing, and data mining, have
deepened the privacy interests implicated in third party handling of data. New
technologies allow information to be generated about which even those to whom the
data relates are unaware. To say that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in this information rather flies in the face of common sense.
The Supreme Court appears to be coming to this conclusion as well. In United
States v. Jones, the Court considered a case involving 28-day surveillance involving
the placement of a GPS chip on a vehicle.114 Although ultimately decided on grounds
of trespass, a shadow majority expressed strong concern about the implications of
long-term surveillance. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and
Justice Kagan, suggested that in most criminal investigations, long-term monitoring
“impinges on expectations of privacy.”115 The nature of new technologies mattered:
Recent years have seen the emergence of many new devices that permit the
monitoring of a person’s movements. In some locales, closed-circuit
television video monitoring is becoming ubiquitous. On toll roads, automatic
toll collection systems create a precise record of the movements of motorists
who choose to make use of their convenience. Many motorists purchase cars
110

Compare, e.g., 1995 EU Directive, Recitation No. 38 (notice) and 41 (right of access), and U.S. laws,
supra note 5.
111 Compare, e.g., 1995 EU Directive, Art. 14 (right to object) and Art. 6 (accurate data); and U.S. laws,
supra note 5.
112 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
113 See, e.g., 1995 EU Directive, Recitation No. 47.
114 United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012).
115 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).

17

that are equipped with devices that permit a central station to ascertain the
car’s location at any time so that roadside assistance may be provided if
needed and the car may be found if it is stolen.116
Justice Sotomayor went one step further, calling into question the entire basis for
third party doctrine. Specifically, in light of the level of intrusiveness represented by
modern technology, “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third
parties.”117 Sotomayor pointed out:
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great
deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying
out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text
to the cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses
with which they correspond to their Internet service providers; and the
books, groceries, and medications they purchase to online retailers.118
She continued, “I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some
member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to
Fourth Amendment protection.”119
Congress has an opportunity to take the lead by recognizing the right to privacy
still held by data holders when information is collected by third parties. It can then
craft statutes accordingly, ensuring that U.S. companies offer greater protections for
consumers, in the process allowing industry to offset the claims of its overseas
competitors.
2. Legal Framework
Thus far, U.S. high technology companies have been subject to a very different
statutory and regulatory structure than that which prevails in the European Union. In
the United States, privacy rights have largely been protected via a series of vertical
statutes dealing with specific areas, such as children using the Internet, driver-related
information, and medical data.
In the EU, in contrast, privacy has been protected by a more omnibus-type
approach, which horizontally reaches across a number of areas. This approach is
reflected in the 1995 Directive as well as the national legislation implementing the
directive on a country-by-country basis.120
The vertical statutory scheme has been successful in addressing particular,
discreet areas where privacy interests reside. However, outside of these narrow
exceptions, in the interests of encouraging innovation, the high technology sector has
been left largely unregulated by federal statute. The assumption has been that market
forces would adjust to protect privacy interests.

116. Id. at 963.
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120 See, e.g., U.K. Data Protection Act of 1998, Germany’s Federal Data Protection Act of 2001, France’s
Data Protection Act of 1978 (revised in 2004), Finland’s Act on the Amendment of the Personal Data Act
(986) 2000; Denmark’s Act on Processing of Personal Data, Act No. 429, May 2000; Greece’s Law No.
2472 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, April 1997.
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The advantage of this approach has been to give high tech companies a significant
amount of flexibility, allowing them to independently gauge the appropriate level of
privacy protections to give to consumers.
The drawback has been that privacy itself has become commoditized, with
companies actually making money off of selling consumers’ privacy interests.
Consider Google and its email service, Gmail, for instance. The company reads
and analyzes all of its customers’ emails, it watches what people read, it looks at web
sites people visit, and it records what people purchase. The company then sells access
to customers’ private lives to companies who want to advertise. Thus, the mother
who sends an email to her son raising concern about depression may receive an ad
within hours for psychiatric services, even as a pregnant woman merely looking at
cribs, may within days receive mail through the U.S. post, advertising sales at Babies
R’Us.
In September 2013 Google lost an effort in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals for
judicial review of a lower court’s refusal to dismiss multiple class action lawsuits
accusing Google of violating the Wiretap Act. U.S. District Judge Lucy Koh
determined that the case is too far along to suffer delays. Koh’s interpretation of the
Electronic communications Privacy Act limits the “ordinary course of business”
exception—not least because Google’s practice violates its own policies. 121 The
lawsuits, filed in California, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, at great
expense, are proceeding.
Capitalizing on private data represents a significant breach of the right to privacy.
Instead of protecting privacy, the market has exploited it for monetary gain. In the
United States and overseas, individuals are concerned about the lack of protections
afforded. Congressional legislation could fix this problem by bringing high
technology within the broader statutory framework and thus closing a gap in the
existing law.
3. Safe Harbor Considerations
In the wake of the Snowden documents, the EU Commission issued a report
recommending the retention of Safe Harbor, but recommending significant changes,
including required disclosure of cloud computing and other service provider contracts
used by Safe Harbor members.
The Safe Harbor provisions, developed 1999-2000 by the U.S. Commerce
Department, the Article 31 Committee on Data Privacy, and the European Union,
created a narrow bridge between the United States and EU. At the time, the European
Parliament, which did not bind the European Commission, rejected the Safe Harbor
provisions by a vote of 279 to 259, with twenty-two abstentions. Chief amongst
European concerns was the failure of the agreement to provide adequate protections.
In light of the massive data breaches we have had over the past five years in the
United States, the practices of a largely unregulated high technology industry, and the
ubiquitous nature of NSA surveillance, Europeans are even less supportive of the Safe
Harbor provisions. They amount to a self-regulated scheme in which the Federal
Trade Commission merely looks at whether a company, which has voluntarily optedin to the program, fails to do what it has stated it will do, within the bounds of its own
privacy policy. Stronger measures are necessary to restore European confidence in
U.S. high technology companies.
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C. Establishing Economic Security as National Security
Economic strength as national security, as was previously discussed, is not a new
concept. The Founding itself was premised, in part, on the importance of economic
security as being vital to U.S. national interests. In 1787 the Articles of Confederation
were written out of existence on economic security grounds, as the country sought to
reassure the international community that it was a viable trading partner. Since that
time, the United States has at times had to remind itself of the importance of the
economy to U.S. national interests. We are once again at such a time.
High technology is a vital part of the U.S. economy. It is both a symbolic and
actual manifestation of the country’s commitment to innovation in every sphere of
life. It plays to the United States’ strengths as a nation. It has the potential to change
regimes, to alter political relationships, and to shape the daily lives of people around
the globe. And it deserves special attention. The danger is that U.S. industry will
become less competitive and that the U.S. will thus lose its dominance in the Internet
economic sphere.
To some extent, we do, structurally, pay some attention to the importance of the
economy. But many consequential decisions are thus not aired in full light of the
possible implications for U.S. national security.122 One way Congress could rectify
this would be to take a look at how to integrate economic concerns, as a statutory
matter, into the national security infrastructure.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
To redress the negative effects that have followed from public awareness of the NSA
programs conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and Section 702 of
the FISA Amendments Act, the most important step that Congress could take would
be to reign in the surveillance authorities themselves, in the process providing greater
transparency and oversight. An alteration in U.S. privacy law would also help to
reassure U.S. customers and individuals located outside domestic bounds that
consumer privacy is protected, thus allowing industry accurately to assert that the
circumstances have changed. Consideration of how to integrate economic concerns
into the national security infrastructure would further help to emphasize the
importance of taking account of the impact of new initiatives on the United States.
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